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How can we explain the reason why cooperatives have evolved so differ-
ently? This article argues that the institutional framework gives a decisive 
influence in organizational evolution and the historic path has been taken 
by interaction between institutions and organizations. The Japanese agricul-
tural cooperatives are analyzed from institutional perspectives. They were 
created at the end of the 19
th century under overwhelming European influ-
ence but evolved as a quite different model under the strong impacts of 
industrial policies and institutions. They developed as multi-purpose coop-
eratives bearing triple natures as state agency, pressure group and cooperative 
per se. The new economy is shifting public policy from protectionist to pro-
competition and the resulting institutional changes are posing challenges to 
cooperatives. Their future depends on their willingness to innovate themselves 
by adjusting to the new environment while applying cooperative advantages. 
Introduction 
Cooperative organizations throughout the world have demonstrated a vast diversity 
by regions, countries and sectors. They are so heterogeneous that it is hardly possible 
to make the meaningful comparison without applying appropriate methods, although 
the Co-operative Identity Statement of the ICA may serve as a common denominator. 
How can we explain the reason why they have evolved so differently? It can be at-
tributable to the diverse cultures and ideologies. But even within the same countries 
we can observe stark contrast in the evolution and the nature of cooperatives.  
The institutional framework has a fundamental influence on the formation and the 
evolution of organizations that have to operate under given sets of rules. In fact, the 
historical evolution has witnessed the interaction between institutions and organiza-
tions. The institutions include the legal and administrative system and pervasive 
practices. They are influenced by the socio-economic policy and culture. 
This article analyzes the Japanese agricultural cooperatives from an institutional 
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perspective. They have been created at the end of the 19
th century under the over-
whelming European influence but evolved to be quite a unique and different model. 
They have grown as multi-purpose cooperatives bearing triple natures as state 
agency, pressure group and cooperative per se. The institutional arrangements and 
state’s industrial policies have heavily affected such an evolution, as they were de-
pendent on agricultural policy and developed strong lobbies. As a result, they have 
quite different membership, governance and management systems, structure and 
functions in comparison with their counterpart in the industrial countries. 
The new economy is causing a drastic shift in the policy direction from protec-
tionist to pro-competition since the global economy and IT revolution is dismantling 
the existing boundaries and barriers among nations and industries. The institutional 
framework is also changing through the liberalization of trade and deregulation of 
industries, posing unprecedented challenges to cooperatives. It is up to them whether 
or not they will tap the opportunity by adjusting to the new environment while mak-
ing use of cooperative advantages. 
Institutions and organizations  
A vast diversity is a prominent feature of cooperative organizations in the world. 
They have been created by people to meet their common needs at the grassroot level 
and in many cases grown organically into regional or national movements. Although 
they have been influenced by some ideas and experiences originated elsewhere, they 
have evolved to be quite distinctive organizations in different countries. They have 
taken diverse development paths in different sectors even in the same country. So we 
need to apply appropriate methods to understand them and make meaningful com-
parisons among them. 
How can we explain the reason why cooperatives have evolved so differently? It 
can be attributable to the diverse culture dominating them and ideologies held by 
their founders and leaders. The collective work in “Consumers against Capitalism” 
explores the historical analysis of consumer co-ops in 10 industrialized countries 
from a cultural perspective (Furlough and Strikwerda, 1999). It describes how con-
sumer co-ops have developed the prominent working class culture as one of three 
pillars supporting the labor movement in the late 19
th and early 20
th centuries but 
could not sustain it in the wake of the emergent capitalist culture based on ideology 
of “consumerism”, which became individualistic, acquisitive and oriented toward 
notions of pleasure and desire. It explains why they could not adapt to the new envi-
ronment brought by mass production and a mass consumption system, and attributes 
their incompetence to the cultural-ideological constraints of leaders. That is surely 
part of the reasons but there would be other factors associated with the profound 
socio-economic transformation. Especially the traditional links with the labor and 
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chall, 2001) when some consumer cooperative organizations have accomplished im-
pressive success in some countries whereas the others have shrunk or collapsed. So a 
wider perspective is needed for a more comprehensive understanding.  
Another collective work in “Agricultural Co-operatives in the European Union” 
sponsored by COGECA offers a comparative study of agricultural co-ops in 15 EU 
countries (van Bekkum and van Dijk, 1997). It describes the position of agriculture 
in the national economy, the brief history and statistics of cooperatives, and com-
pares their structure, membership, capital formation, taxation, R&D, marketing and 
internationalization. It distinguishes two main solutions to improve the effectiveness 
of co-operatives for the future; the countervailing power cooperative model (e.g., 
wheat pools) and the entrepreneurial cooperative model (e.g., new generation co-
ops). The former is based on the economy of scale attained by pooling bargaining 
power but increasingly facing the stiff price competition resulting from trade liberali-
zation, while the latter promotes product differentiation and consumer loyalty 
through forward integration into value-added activities but requires changes in legis-
lation for its development.  Finally it suggests that the European Commission should 
induce member states to adopt the competition law setting common rules at the EU 
level, work on harmonization of legislation on the cooperative business form and 
enact the European Co-operative Statute. 
In the light of the institutional perspective underlying this article, the new institu-
tional economics shows that institutions matter in the evolution of organizations. 
Institutions are “the rules of the game in a society or the humanly devised constraints 
that shape human interaction” (North, 1990). They include both formal constraints 
(legal and administrative system, contracts, etc.) and informal ones (conventions, 
codes of conduct, etc.). The institutional framework fundamentally influences what 
organizations come into existence and how they evolve. In turn, organizations influ-
ence how the institutional framework evolves. Organizations are created in the wake 
of opportunities resulting from the existing sets of constraints, and in the course of 
attempts to accomplish their objectives become a major agent of institutional change. 
Institutions affect the performance of economies, and different performance over 
time is explained by path dependence. They give fundamental influence to organiza-
tions’ economic and social performance, both positively and negatively.  
The comparative institutional analysis seeks to explain why the economic systems 
have not converged into the Anglo-American system, which is often seen as a uni-
versal model by the mainstream neoclassical economics, but have rather evolved 
differently in Europe, Japan and other regions, suggesting plural evolutionary equi-
libriums (Aoki, 1995, 2001). The analysis aims to find sources and conditions 
generating “the gains from diversity” using universal tools of analysis. It also sug-
gests “institutional complementarities” in that some institutions are reinforced by 
others, which means that they become stronger against the environmental changes. 
For example, the Japanese corporate governance system is compatible with contin-
gent monitoring of main banks and lifelong employment while the American system 
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share values) backed by corporate control market and external labor market. 
Institutions are also influenced by the public policy on the one hand, and culture 
on the other. Especially the change in socio-economic policy surely induces the 
transformation in institutions; e.g., the shift to pro-competition policy will lead to 
abolition of rationing or quota system. Even the changing culture may result in 
changes in regulations and norms of behavior; e.g., increasing tolerance to smoking 
marijuana led to its legalization in The Netherlands. These elements also contribute 
to deciding the historical path of organizations. But the emphasis here is on the inter-
action between institutions and organizations, while the public policy is also 
analyzed as a determinant factor changing both of them. 
 











Institutional framework of cooperatives 
The institutional framework of cooperatives is composed of the specific cooperative 
legislation, administration and convention, which directly influence the cooperative 
behavior. However, the wider socio-economic institutions also place the constraints 
and rules under which cooperatives operate. Being economic enterprises, they have 
to comply with competition laws and various socio-economic regulations. Institu-
tions and public policies aiming at promoting specific industries are also affecting 
the cooperatives. 
The cooperative legislation includes both statute and common laws. It may be 
backed by the provisions in the Constitution. It constitutes the overall framework of 
the cooperative activities, but the extent of constraints varies from one country to 
another. It can be neutral to any organizational form and give equal treatment to co-
operatives as seen in most of industrialized countries. It can favor cooperatives by 
allowing a supportive treatment in taxation and subsidies while placing them in the 
strict control as in the case of many developing countries. It can be restrictive by 
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prohibiting some areas and modes of operations (Japan, Korea, etc.). The single   
cooperative laws covering all sectors are adopted in many countries while the sepa-
rate laws are in effect to supervise specific sectors in other countries. In the latter 
case sectoral cooperatives tend to take different paths of evolution. In some countries 
there exist no separate legislation for cooperatives, which are regulated by the gen-
eral civil-commercial laws (Denmark, Switzerland, etc.). The model bylaws are 
provided to help societies to make their own bylaws or rules.  
The administration system concerning cooperatives demonstrates even greater di-
versity. The cooperative ministries or registrars in the developing countries have 
exerted the overwhelming power for almost all aspects of cooperative activities, includ-
ing management, capitalization, auditing, education and training. The governments that 
have seen cooperatives as the engine for development policy have provided promo-
tional measures and imposed strict regulations. In contrast, the function of juridical 
bodies concerning cooperatives is generally confined to the general supervision in 
the industrialized countries but can include various extension services when the gov-
ernments seek to utilize cooperative channels to promote the public policy as often 
seen in the agricultural sector. Cooperatives are also subject to the regulations made 
by relevant authorities, e.g., cooperative banks are often supervised by the ministry 
of finance. The taxation system also constitutes an important framework for coopera-
tive activities.  
The convention and tradition also shape the institutional framework. The tradi-
tional community ties in villages, often reinforced by ostracism, have been conducive 
to foundation and continuation of agricultural cooperatives. The common bond nur-
tured around communities, workplaces or religions have been the driving force in 
creating credit unions. The preference for collective action to individual choice might 
be seen in the Asian values motivating cooperation. This helped Asian cooperatives 
to run business based on traditional groups, but their performance was a mixed one. 
The dominant gender bias in the society has discouraged women from active partici-
pation although they constituted the bulk of farmers and consumers who use 
cooperative services. The pervasive practices in labor relations, education and em-
ployment are also affecting the cooperatives. 
The competition laws and socio-economic regulations also influence cooperative 
activities. The voluntary agreements on fair competition in each industry supplement 
the legal enforcement. The cooperatives are often seen to exert the countervailing 
power by organizing small producers or consumers against monopolies and promote 
competition. So, they are exempted from cartel prohibition as in the case of the Capper-
Volstead Act (USA) of 1922 or the Anti-Monopoly Law (Japan) of 1947. But even in 
that case cooperatives are not allowed to use unfair transaction methods or raise price 
by restricting competition. Had they grown so as to exert market power, they could 
be questioned on seller’s monopoly or buyer’s monopsony. Cooperatives are also 
affected by economic regulations for eliminating new entries where state monopoly 
or licensing exist for some products and services (liquor and cigarette, staple food, 
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standards, environmental protections, etc., are applied to all organizations irrespec-
tive of their legal forms. 
The industry-related regulations have the strong influence where the economic 
policy tries to promote or protect the specific industries characterized by lower pro-
ductivity. Especially the strong agricultural policy has given the major influence to 
the structure and behavior of agricultural cooperatives in many countries. The restric-
tive commercial policy aiming at protecting small retailers has also influenced 
consumer cooperatives in some countries.  
The case of multi-purpose agricultural cooperatives 
Cooperatives in Japan started at the turn of the 19th century under the overwhelming 
European influence. As Johnston Birchall pointed, after the first attempts at modern 
cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region made in Australia around the 1860s, coopera-
tion came next to Japan (Birchall, 1997). By the end of the century there were around 
450 agricultural cooperatives, which were organized along Raiffeisen lines. The In-
dustrial Cooperative Law was enacted in 1900 after German legislation. However, 
the Japanese cooperatives have evolved along a quite different model, the multi-
purpose agricultural one. The hypothesis that the institutional framework has con-
tributed to the evolution of a unique cooperative model is to be tested hereafter. 
The industrial cooperative law of 1900 
The Industrial Cooperative Law was enacted by the government aiming to improve 
productivity and help farmers to counter moneylenders. It had the paternalistic ele-
ments reflecting the top-down approach initiated by bureaucrats. The cooperatives 
had been placed under almighty government control; the governor could give permis-
sion to their establishment, suspend or dissolve them, order reporting at any time, 
make inspection, reverse the resolutions of general assemblies and order reelection of 
office bearers. The Law was all embracing; it governed credit, marketing, supply and 
production (later replaced by service co-ops), and allowed the multi-purpose model. 
It mainly targeted to serve agricultural co-ops in the rural area but also covered credit 
and consumer co-ops in the urban area. 
The state had vital roles in promoting and regulating cooperatives. The rural in-
dustrial co-ops had been set up in all villages around 1920 and covered all farmers in 
the 1930s. Organizationally they had taken over the character of villages based on 
both territorial and vocational homogeneity of farmers, resulting in almost compul-
sory membership. More importantly they were largely dependent upon government’s 
direct assistance for creating cooperative federations and the Central Industrial Co-op 
Bank as semi-governmental organization. They were used as the agency for imple-
menting government’s agricultural policy. For example, they took the merchants’ 
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price by the Agricultural Warehouse Law of 1917 and the Rice Control Law of 1933. 
Likewise the MAFF (see f.n. 1) Ordinance for Improving Fertilizer Distribution of 
1930, which prioritized cooperative channels, enlarged their handling of fertilizer at 
the expense of merchants. To save farmers from bankruptcy under the rural recession 
by providing low-interest loans to replace the high interest usury, the government 
money was channeled through the Central Industrial Co-op Bank and primary co-ops 
according to the criteria set by the MAFF.  
Thus rural industrial co-ops were integrated as part of a government system for 
implementing the agricultural policy while they came to organize almost all farmers 
and had the capacity to lead them. At the same time, their growth had induced the 
anti-co-op campaigns by rural merchants around 1930. In this period they started 
developing the prototype of multi-purpose co-ops covering the four functions of 
credit, marketing, supply and service as they took over the economic activities from 
rural merchants. But it was after the Great Depression that industrial co-ops became 
important players in the rural economy. The proportion of multi-purpose co-ops con-
solidating four functions rose from 31 in 1932 to 71 percent in 1937. However the 
potential of multi functional operations was not fully realized since landlords and 
tenant farmers had not necessarily have homogeneous interests and there were often 
conflicts between them. The former had often dominated the cooperatives while the 
latter had sought to take over the leadership.  
The other root of agricultural co-ops was farmers’ associations organized under 
the Farmers Associations Law of 1899. They were created de facto compulsorily in 
all villages to channel government subsidies for introducing modern technologies and 
facilities aiming at increased productivity and self-sufficiency when Japan was mov-
ing to import rice. From the beginning they were not spontaneous associations but 
parastatal organs to implement the agricultural policy as a branch of the MAFF. 
During World War II the whole agricultural sector was reorganized into the state 
body to strengthen the control of farmers aiming at increasing food production. The 
Agricultural Organizations Law of 1943 integrated rural industrial co-ops, farmer 
associations and other farmer organizations (livestock, sericulture and tea growers 
co-ops). With this, industrial co-ops became the wartime mobilization mechanism for 
controlling farmers with compulsory membership, completely losing a residual coopera-
tive character.  
Separate legislation and transition to agricultural cooperatives 
The end of World WarⅡ opened a new way to the cooperative legislation; separate 
legislation was introduced under the American Occupation in 1945-1951. In this pe-
riod the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the Occupation Army ruled Japan aiming at 
demilitarizing it and transforming it to the democratic state in accordance with the 
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tizing measures; dismantling the Zaibatsu (financial combines controlled by core 
families) by the Anti-monopoly Law of 1947, legitimating the trade unions by the 
Trade Union Law of 1945 and the agrarian reform by the Land Reform Law of 1946.  
The process of cooperative legislation was part of such an overall transformation 
and heavily influenced by so-called New Dealers who were seeking economic de-
mocracy. The Anti-monopoly Law (Article 24) exempted certain cooperatives from 
its application except for the restrictive trade practices, following the example of 
Capper-Volstead Act of 1922. Such co-ops should be established based on the legal 
provisions and meet four requirements: a) aiming at mutual benefits among small 
producers or consumers; b) voluntary and open membership; c) equal voting rights 
for each member; d) limited compensation when distributing surplus. Thus the Anti-
monopoly Law defined the criteria for Ideal-type cooperatives to be applied to all 
kinds of co-ops.  
The Agricultural Cooperative Law was enacted in 1947 after the agrarian reform 
was introduced. As early as December 1945, General MacArthur of the GHQ issued a 
Directive for Farmers Liberation to democratize rural economy by liberating farmers 
from landlords exploitation and government controls which had brought the poverty-
stricken villages to be attributable to Japan’s militarism and expansionism. The former 
objective was achieved by Agrarian Reform while the GHQ intended to realize the 
latter by dissolving the Agricultural Organizations and establishing the agricultural 
cooperatives anew, based on democratic principles. The law was redrafted several 
times in the light of the differing opinions between the GHQ and the MAFF; the former 
insisted to separate the credit business from other businesses like in other industrialized 
countries while the latter persisted in maintaining the multi-purpose model. Finally, the 
GHQ made concession and the Law was enacted. In the process of transformation in 
1947-1948 the MAFF took the measures called “comprehensive succession”; proper-
ties, offices, boards and employees of the Agricultural Organizations were taken over 
by multi-purpose agricultural co-ops. In 1948 ca. 17,000 Agricultural Organizations 
had been transformed into more than 22,000 agricultural co-ops and 400 federations. 
Thus the agricultural co-ops had inherited the basic character of the industrial co-ops as 
the state agency. This process resulted in lack of consciousness that farmers should 
spontaneously set up their co-ops; for many of them the signboard was changed to co-
ops overnight. What is more, the Ministry continued to favor the multi-purpose model 
and to authorize only one co-op in one area on the ground that competition among 
many co-ops could weaken their financial basis. This measure has led to the territorial 
monopoly, depriving farmers of the choice. In 1948 the national federations for guid-
ance, marketing and supply were formed and finally the Central Union of Agricultural 
Co-ops (CUAC) was set up as the apex organization in 1954. Moreover, agricultural 
co-ops had been assisted by the state through rehabilitating and promoting measures 
i.e., laws for rehabilitating ailing co-ops (1951), creating federations (1953) or promot-
ing mergers among co-ops (1956, 1961).  
In this period the other cooperative laws were separately enacted to serve the spe-
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consumers, the Fishery Co-op Law of 1948 for fishermen/marine product industry, 
the Small & Medium Enterprises Co-op Law of 1949 for small businesses, the Credit 
Bank Law of 1951 for urban businesses, and the Labor Bank Law of 1953 for work-
ers, etc. Such separate legislation has given great impacts to cooperative 
organizations; it has driven co-ops to take quite different paths, which made it diffi-
cult to conduct the joint actions and formulate the common strategy. The separation 
of regulatory bodies has contributed to divergence, often spurred by the sectionalism 
of the ministries.
1 The other problem is the legal vacuum for the newly created co-
ops including worker co-ops, hybrid co-ops, etc. 
Agrarian reform and land ownership 
Some institutional frameworks have influenced the evolution of agricultural co-ops. 
First of all, the GHQ urged the Japanese government to undertake the Agrarian Re-
form, which created a large number of landed farmers by redistributing landlord’s 
estates and split land ownership into small farms in 1946-47. As a result, large-scale 
and absentee landlords had disappeared while emergent owner farmers had more 
homogeneous interests in joint actions and their needs could be conveniently met by 
all-embracing services provided by multi-purpose co-ops. The Agricultural Land 
Law was enacted in 1952 to protect owner farmers by placing various restrictions to 
the transfer of land; restricted lots’ space for ownership, prohibition of absentee land-
lords, controlled rents for tenants and permission required to cancel leasing contracts. 
It also confined farmland ownership to farmers and did not allow corporations to 
enter. These restrictions contributed to maintaining small ownership of land while 
hampering the expansion of farms’ scale through concentration of land use and/or 
ownership to entrepreneurial farmers.  
In addition, the rapid economic growth triggered skyrocketing of land prices to 
the extent of prohibiting farmers to buy at earnings discounted price while farmers in 
suburban areas could become upstart millionaires by selling land after getting per-
mission for conversion from cultivation to other development purposes. Since the 
cost of ownership for farmland was very low in terms of property and inheritance 
tax, farmers chose to retain land expecting a huge gain in the future. These factors 
have contributed to the delay of concentration of land to viable farmers and retention 
of part-time farmers. The law was amended several times but could not reverse such 
trend. Agricultural co-ops pursued an egalitarian approach and tended to maintain a 
current structure based on owner farmers, reflecting interests of part-time farmers as 
against entrepreneurial farmers, and strongly opposed new entries from the non-
agricultural sector, especially joint stock companies. Thus it can be said that they 
contributed to status quo in land ownership. 
                                                        
1  Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) for the first industry co-ops, Ministry of 
Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW) for consumer co-ops, Ministry of Finance (MOF) for credit co-ops 
and labor banks, and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) for SME co-ops, etc. 120  A. Kurimoto 
 
As a result, the land ownership remained small (on average 1.5 hectare per farm), 
which largely inhibited rationalization and mechanization. While farmers’ overall 
standard of living had been enhanced thanks to off-farm incomes and their income 
had surpassed workers’ income in 1970, the productivity of agriculture was not im-
proved as expected by the Agriculture Basic Law of 1961. The diversified diet of 
consumers accompanied with westernized lifestyles resulted in the sharp increase of 
import of food and fodders. As a result, the food self-sufficiency rate on calorie base 
has dropped substantially from 79 percent in 1960 to 40 percent in 2000. 
Stable food control system and institutional credit system 
The stable food control system has also constituted an important institutional frame-
work. The Stable Food Control Law was enacted in 1942 to control the production 
and distribution of staples such as rice, wheat, and so on, under the wartime econ-
omy, in which they were wholly collected and rationed to cope with the severe 
shortage of food during and immediately after the war. This system had provided for 
the institutional framework of controlling price and quantity of staple food as well as 
a distribution channel. The government bought all the crops in the initial stage, set 
prices and margins for buying, wholesaling and retailing, and controlled the entire 
international trade. The distribution channel was fixed to a singular line from farmers 
to consumers, leaving no room for choice (Chart 2). Agricultural co-ops were as-
signed as sole collecting agents; from primary co-ops to provincial federations and 
national federation (Zen-no). Only licensed wholesaler or retailers could deal with 
staples. When the urgent food crisis was overcome and the oversupply became the 
major problem since the 1960s, it was modified to accommodate more market 
mechanism, but the basic idea was not changed.  
This system has brought some significant effects on agricultural cooperatives. 
First of all, farmers pressed the government to raise rice price beyond equilibrium 
while the higher price stimulated the overproduction. Cooperatives strongly mobi-
lized farmers to rice price campaign in parallel with trade unions’ drive for higher 
wages since the 1960s but soon had to cooperate with the government’s program of 
cutting back on the acreage under cultivation. Secondly, the raised price helped mar-
ginal farmers to remain in unprofitable farming, which might otherwise resist. They 
were employed in factories and other businesses to earn a living and constitute a bulk 
of cooperative membership. They were concerned with multiple services provided by 
co-ops, rather than competitive marketing capacity. Thirdly, cooperatives became 
almost a monopoly in collecting government controlled rice and commanded nearly 
30 percent of wholesales. They could automatically earn handling charges and deep-
ened dependence on rice distribution as a mainstay of marketing business. Zen-no 
(National Federation of Agricultural Co-ops) exerted decisive power in maintaining 
higher price in the quasi market for rice price. As such, cooperatives contributed to 
the continued existence of food control system for more than 50 years. 
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The character of co-ops as a state agency is more apparent in their credit business. The 
MAFF developed two kinds of “institutional credit systems” since the middle of the 
1950s. One is the credit of the Agricultural Finance Corporation, which gives public 
funds’ long-term loans to farmers at low interest rate where the whole business in con-
tacting the debtors is entrusted to agricultural co-ops. The other is the co-ops’ credit for 
Agricultural Modernization, i.e., the low-interest loan (with part of the interest being 
subsidized by the government) which sets the terms of loans while leaving co-ops only 
to handle the administrative work. This meant that they were deprived of autonomy in 
making use of their own funds, thus becoming the state’s subcontractors. 
In short, agricultural cooperatives have been involved by the state as a major 
player for implementing agricultural policies through various legal-administrative 
measures and subsidies/loans, ranging from the macro policies such as the price 
maintenance scheme covering more than 90 percent of farm products; the selective 
expansion/reduction of production; the financial stabilization scheme; the reform of 
farming infrastructure, etc., to the micro policies such as modernization of farm fa-
cilities. The co-ops have been often designated as the sole agent to implement the 
promotion measures. They have also acted as subcontractors to channel the public 
money to farmers. Thus they have been “institutionally” ensured to benefit from 
promotion measures and subsidies. 
Such commitment with the public policies has given another dimension to the co-ops 
as one of the strongest pressure groups. As the farmers’ income was largely dependent on 
the agricultural policies, they became very active in pressing the government to raise the 
controlled prices for rice and milk and stop the liberalization of agricultural imports. To 
attain such objectives, they organized from time to time nationwide campaigns, often 
mobilizing thousands of farmers. In the national/municipal/local elections they sponsored 
MPs who could represent their interests in the parliament/councils and press the govern-
ment. Taking these factors into consideration, it is argued that the evolution of 
agricultural co-ops has resulted in the three-fold combination of state agents, pressure 
groups and co-ops per se (Fujitani, 1992). 
Evolution of the multi-purpose model of agricultural cooperatives 
The multi-purpose agricultural cooperatives undertake multiple functions such as 
marketing, supply, finance, farming guidance and other services in the same organi-
zation while single-purpose agricultural co-ops are specialized in one function. The 
desirability of multi-purpose versus single-purpose co-ops has been often propagated 
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(Watkins, 1967:53-54; Rana, 1974:3-5; Madane, 1990:52-55), but there seems to be 
pros and cons; it largely depends on the socio-economic background where co-ops 
operate and the choice farmers have made. 
This model has spread in some Asian countries including Japan, Korea, Taiwan, 
Sri Lanka, Iran, etc. But the most typical case can be found in Japan. To propagate 
his notion of a cooperative community, Laidlaw (1980:66) mentioned the Japanese 
multi-purpose cooperative as an example: 
Consider what the rural multi-purpose cooperative does and what it provides 
in the typical Japanese setting. It provides farming inputs and markets the ag-
ricultural product; it is a thrift and credit organization, an insurance agency, a 
center for consumer supplies; it provides medical services, and hospital care in 
some places: it has extension and field services for farmers, and a community 
center for cultural activities. In short, this kind of cooperative embraces as 
broad a range of economic and social services as possible. Life for the rural 
people and the whole community would be entirely different without such a 
cooperative. 
Such a comprehensive approach was necessary and possible owing to cohesive 
rural communities. The main crop has been rice grown in the paddy fields, which 
required the collective actions such as water management, vermin extermination, 
planting and harvesting, and so on. The traditional community tie had facilitated such 
joint actions, often enforced by ostracism. Even before the Meiji Restoration in 1868, 
there existed mutual help schemes such as “Yui” (joint work for planting and har-
vesting) and “Koh” (rotating credit society). At the same time, farmers had 
homogeneous interests in joint actions and their needs could be conveniently met by 
all-embracing services provided by co-ops. For instance, farmers could get credits 
when they bought agricultural inputs and machineries while they could pay back 
when their crops or livestock were sold. They could benefit from co-ops’ farm guid-
ance services combined with supply and marketing plans. They could insure their life 
and properties against risks of accidents and bad crop while they could receive medi-
cal and social services when necessary.  
In the process of evolution, agricultural co-ops have even expanded their multi-
purpose character including insurance, health and social care, food processing, land 
development and housing, travel, culture, funeral, and so on. But the supply and 
marketing businesses have been constantly losing money while the surplus generated 
by the credit and insurance businesses have been used to offset the deficits. In each 
business area the national and provincial federations were set up and were affiliated 
with the national and provincial unions as apex organizations. Thus they developed 
three-tier keitou, the hierarchical agricultural cooperative system.     Agricultural Cooperatives in Japan  123 
 
Economic and social performance of cooperatives 
It looks like contradictory to see that the institutional framework has helped the ex-
pansion of the agricultural cooperative system although it has not contributed to the 
increased productivity of farmers. Rather it can be explained that the cooperative 
system has effectively served the needs of a homogeneous membership characterized 
by small ownership with low productivity.  
The number of JAs (the new logo standing for Japan Agricultural Co-op adopted 
in 1992) has been drastically reduced due to the perpetual mergers, accelerated in the 
1990s to create financial and managerial capacity (Figure 1). Their membership ex-
ceeds 9 million, organizing most of the farming population while regular members 
have been declining since the 1970s, reflecting the ever-shrinking industry. Only 
farmers and agricultural juridical persons are eligible for regular members. The 
membership has been based on households, traditionally represented by male farmers 
as landowners. So, female farmers constitute 13 percent of co-op membership or 0.2 
percent of board members although they contribute to two thirds of the work force. 
Recently agricultural co-ops have made efforts to increase female members by en-
couraging plural membership from each household, but the sheer gender imbalance is 
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The urbanization of suburbs resulted in the inclusion of local residents, suppliers and 
others as associate members without voting rights. Originally co-ops accepted non-
farmers as a result of comprehensive changes further to the Second World War, but 
associate members drastically increased since the 1960s, as they wished to use coop-
erative services such as banking and insurance. This process triggered the 
controversy between a functionalist versus a communitarian view. The former in-
sisted that co-ops should stick to agriculture and concentrate to serve farmers’ 
professional needs while the latter advocated that co-ops could accept interested resi-
dents as associate members and turn into community-based organizations serving a 
wider spectrum of needs. In the end the reality superseded the former idea: co-ops 
evolved into community enterprises and increased dependence on financial services. 
However, the increasing number of associate members is generating serious govern-
ance problems as to how to involve them in decision-making. 
As a result of the evolution supported by institutional framework, agricultural co-
ops became a powerful body of agri-business. The deposits and loans have signifi-
cantly increased, which made JA the largest bank in terms of deposits and assets 
(Figure 2). Zenkyoren (National Federation of Agricultural Insurance Co-ops) is also 
the largest insurance company in terms of long-term contracted amount. Zen-no is 
comparable to the biggest trading firms. However, the marketing and supply business 
largely declined in the 1990s, accumulating a great amount of losses. It became diffi-
cult to offset these losses by the shrinking profits in the financial sector due to stiffer 
competition. The market share largely varies from regulated products to freely traded 
commodities. Generally, JAs have enjoyed a high farmer patronage for rice and milk 
but face stiff competition from non-agricultural operators such as trading firms or 
meat packers who promote the vertical integration in broiler and chicken production. 
The deregulation of food distribution policy brought the intensified competition and 
resulted in the slightly decreasing patronage of farmers (Table 1).  
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Table 1:  JAs’ farmers’ patronage (%) 
 
    1995   1996   1997   1998   1999  
Gov. controlled rice  98.8   99.3   99.2   98.4   97.8  
Vegetables  98.5   93.2   93.6   93.1   93.4  
Liquid milk  95.8   93.5   93.8   93.0   92.7  
Broiler & chicken  81.6   47.7   52.4   40.1   43.0  
Cattle  87.8   87.1   86.4   87.8   87.2  
Pig  94.6   93.8   93.0   93.1   91.0  
Total marketing  92.7   91.2   90.6   90.4   87.9  
Fodder  77.2   72.7   72.9   71.4   69.8  
Fertilizers  85.8   85.0   84.6   84.4   83.2  
Pesticide  72.1   70.1   69.4   69.0   67.8  
Machinery  75.5   74.6   73.9   72.9   71.8  
Total supply  73.5   72.0   71.8   70.6   69.8  
 
At the same time, co-ops have played the pivotal role of maintaining the social cohe-
sion of rural communities. Although there exist competing businesses in villages 
with some density of population, it is inconceivable to live in under populated vil-
lages without comprehensive services provided by co-ops, involving a wide spectrum 
of farmers’ life from cradle to grave, often without covering expenses. Co-ops have 
been often seen as stable employers comparable to village administration offices. 
However, they could not stop the overall reduction of population in rural areas and 
the decay of marginal villages. 
New economy causing institutional changes 
We have witnessed the overall shift from state control to market mechanism since the 
late 1980s. This shift of power has been prompted by so called New Economy. The 
barriers set by borders among nations or industries have been substantially lowered 
by the advent of global economy and information technology. The roles of states 
have been questioned and institutions are being redesigned to meet the new require-
ments brought by changing paradigms.  
The institutional framework of cooperatives also undergoes drastic changes. In 
the field of cooperative legislation, paternalistic laws based on state’s protection and 
control are being replaced by more liberal ones based on the autonomy and self-
responsibility of cooperatives in developing countries and economies in transition. 
The expected role of administration systems on cooperatives is also changing from 
top-down dictating to horizontal partnership. This explains the background of adopting 
the ICA Statement on Co-operative Identity (1995) and new ILO Recommendation 
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The magnitude of changes in the institutional framework of industries is even 
greater. The big bang in the financial sector has changed the face of industry, where 
the Anglo-American business models are often seen as global standards. The tradi-
tional agricultural policy is giving way to more competition and consumer 
orientation under the WTO Agreement, which requires the liberalization of trade and 
overall reduction of state subsidies. The food standards are being harmonized under 
the universal rule settings enacted by the FAO/WHO CODEX Alimentarius Com-
mission, lowering national barriers. The food processing and retailing is an arena 
where multi-nationals are competing to dominate the markets beyond frontiers, al-
though national commercial policies are far from harmonization and are still being 
fought among conflicting interests. The overall withdrawal of states from social ser-
vice provisions opened new opportunities to the private sector including cooperatives 
and nonprofits. In short, the power shift from states to markets leads to the reorienta-
tion of public policies and institutions from protection to competition. Such paradigm 
changes in the New Economy pose both threat and opportunities to cooperatives.  
Deregulation challenges agricultural co-ops  
Multi-purpose agricultural co-ops are facing the challenges caused by deregulation 
and liberalization. The global economy has pushed governments to reduce public 
spending and open the domestic market. The traditional protectionist policies gave 
way to pro-competition in conformity with the GATT Agreement on Agriculture in 
1993, urging a wider use of market mechanisms. The agricultural market for major 
products including beef, orange and rice was opened to the foreign producers in spite 
of strong resistance from agricultural co-ops. In addition, the 1990s witnessed a 
number of deregulation measures. The staple food control system was replaced by 
the Foodstuff Law in 1994 that brought market-based pricing, easier entry and free 
access to distribution channels, leaving the state limited functions such as minimum 
access import and staples stockpile preparing for emergency. It meant that the gov-
ernment’s hard control system was replaced by the soft system where co-ops had to 
assume some responsibilities for production adjustment and stockpiling. The Agri-
cultural Land Law has not yet been changed, but a joint stock company was allowed 
to enter the industry as an agricultural production corporation in 2000. Farmers’ 
needs are also changing and diversified, which makes the co-op’s egalitarian ap-
proach more difficult. More entrepreneurial farmers tend to do direct transactions 
with suppliers or buyers where they find the economic advantages by doing so. The 
New Agriculture Basic Law of 1999 is meant to spur such directions and bring con-
siderable changes to the agricultural co-ops’ dominance in marketing and promotion 
measures. Some business leaders and politicians question even the exemption of co-
ops from the Anti-Monopoly Law or insist to sever financial business from JAs.  
Under such circumstances, cooperatives have to strengthen the cooperative iden-
tity by sticking to their membership and attaining independence from the state, 
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able agriculture, streamline the whole system by promoting mergers and integrating 
into two-tier organizations. The multi-purpose model will be maintained provided the 
drastic restructuring measures are undertaken to solve structural imbalance, since 
financial functions can no longer earn sufficient surpluses to offset the loss-making 
functions because of stiffer competition. Norinchukin (Central Cooperative Bank) 
made the vertical integration to create a JA bank system with a stricter discipline and 
a larger safety net against insolvency. Zenkyoren (National Mutual Insurance Federa-
tion of Agricultural Cooperatives) absorbed the provincial federations to create a 
single insurance co-op. Co-op’s marketing and supply functions are also pursuing 
“selection and concentration”. It means 12,000 depots for supplying fertil-
izer/pesticide will be concentrated in 300 regional warehouses and unprofitable retail 
outlets, and service stations are to be separated as subsidiary companies.  
But these have to accelerate such a restructuring process to remain as viable busi-
ness organization supported by farmers and consumers. The Minister of Agriculture 
urged co-ops “to reform or to dissolve” and set up the Commission on Agricultural 
Co-ops, which produced a report in March 2003 (MAFF, 2003). The Commission 
pointed out that co-ops should increase farmers’ income by active marketing of 
products and reduction of input costs, and drastic rationalization of supply/marketing 
businesses so as to pay without compensation from financial businesses. It also rec-
ognized that the government’s stance of using co-ops as its agents had inhibited their 
independence and recommended a clear-cut division of roles, confining the former to 
regulatory supervision. In particular, the government is requested to make equal 
treatment of co-ops and other farmer organizations as regards channeling subsidies 
and closely monitoring co-ops’ unfair trade practices, in collaboration with the Fair 
Trade Commission. It is ironical to see that co-ops are requested to become inde-
pendent by a government that used them as effective means to implement a public 
agricultural policy. 
Conclusion 
Organizations evolve to adapt to the changing environment in economic systems, 
social structure, demography, technology, the dominant culture and ideology. Institu-
tions constitute very important components of such environments. It seems that 
organizations may adapt to institutions too successfully and become “institutional-
ized” as in the case of Japanese agricultural co-ops, which had evolved to act as 
agents for implementing public agricultural policy. It is also evident that organiza-
tions cannot escape institutions and we need to be alert to the institutional changes 
that may cease to be positive and turn into negative effects. This is what happens to 
the agricultural co-ops, which are struggling to adapt to the new environment, 
strengthen their core competence and realign their structure. But it is generally ob-
served that the speed of reforms is not high enough to meet the requirements of the 128  A. Kurimoto 
 
time while there still are gaps in the perceived crises and future directions amongst 
co-op leaders. Some co-ops are shifting to the new directions by innovating opera-
tions and finding new markets, while the others are kept in organizational inertia. On 
the other hand, entrepreneurial farmers and non-agricultural businesses started a 
number of experiments to bring about innovations in the food system, often being 
encouraged by the government’s scheme which allows operators to make trials for 
structural reform in special zones. The agricultural co-ops can no longer ignore such 
initiatives and try to involve themselves in such ventures, instead of resisting them to 
maintain the existing institutional framework. They are expected to rejuvenate their 
organizational structure and business practices to accommodate the diversified inter-
ests of members in the era of New Economy.  
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